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Although normal distributions and related current quantitative methods are still relevant for some organizational research,the growing ubiquity of power laws signiﬁes that Pareto rank/frequency distributions, fractals, and underlying scale-free
theories are increasingly pervasive and valid characterizations of organizational dynamics. When they apply, researchers
ignoring power-law effects risk drawing false conclusions and promulgating useless advice to practitioners. This is because
what is important to most managers are the extremes they face, not the averages. We show that power laws are pervasive in
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Although normal (bell-shaped) distributions and
related quantitative methods are still relevant for a sig-
niﬁcant portion of organizational research, the increas-
ing discovery of power laws signiﬁes that Pareto
rank/frequency distributions, fractals, and underlying
scale-free (SF) theories are pervasive and valid charac-
terizations of nonlinear organizational dynamics. Where
they validly apply, researchers ignoring Pareto distribu-
tions risk drawing false conclusions and promulgating
useless advice to practitioners. This is because under
many circumstances what is important to most managers
are the extremes they face, not the averages. Given this,
we raise the question: How do we redirect organization
science toward the study of Pareto distributions in ways
that still fall within the bounds of an effective science?
Power laws signify Pareto rank/frequency distri-
butions having long and fat tails, potentially inﬁ-
nite variance, unstable means, and unstable conﬁdence
intervals. Pareto distributions are alien to most quan-
titative organizational researchers, who are trained via
Gaussian statistics to go to great lengths to conﬁgure
their data to ﬁt the requirements of linear regression
models and related statistical methods. For example,
most of the discussion in econometrics textbooks, such
as Greene (2002), aims to accomplish this. Gaussian dis-
tributions have vanishing tails, thereby allowing focus
to dwell on limited variance and stable means. As a
result, conﬁdence intervals for statistical signiﬁcance
are clearly deﬁned, stable, and squeezed in toward the
mean, increasingly the likelihood of achieving statistical
signiﬁcance.
The implications for organization science, however,
go beyond extreme events. Tools do not exist in a
theoretical vacuum. The adoption of normal distribu-
tion statistics carries a heavy burden of assumptions.
Reliance on linearity, randomness, and equilibrium inﬂu-
ences how theories are built, how legitimacy is con-
ferred, and how research questions are formulated.
Abbott (2001) says that linear thinking, what he calls
the General Linear Model, deﬁnes the philosophical
and methodological assumptions upon which linear sci-
ence is based. It affects (a) how units of analysis are
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conceptualized, selected, and operationalized; (b) how
variables are selected; and (c) how the interactions
among variables are described by quantitative/qualitative
models. Given these premises, we introduce scalabil-
ity and the study of SF theories to begin a reorienta-
tion of the organization science paradigm from linear
toward a Pareto based science more relevant to nonlin-
ear organizational phenomena.
Scalability results from what Mandelbrot (1982) calls
fractal geometry. A cauliﬂower is an obvious exam-
ple. Cut off a ﬂoret, cut a smaller ﬂoret from the
ﬁrst ﬂoret, then a cut piece off the second, and so
on. Now set them in line on a table. Each subcom-
ponent is smaller than the former; each has the same
shape and structure. They are fractal because they all
look and behave about the same way. Fractals are
signiﬁed by power laws and rank/frequency distribu-
tions. Researchers ﬁnd organization-related power laws
in intraﬁrm decisions, consumer sales, salaries, size
of ﬁrms, ecosystems, director interlocks, biotech net-
works, and industrial districts, for example. These are
all rank/frequency distributions.
Responding to the state of scientiﬁc disciplines of
many kinds, Gell-Mann emphasized the study of “sur-
face complexity arising out of deep simplicity” at the
founding of the Santa Fe Institute (1988, p. 3; his ital-
ics). In describing the Santa Fe vision, Brock says the
study of complexity “   tries to understand the forces
that underlie the patterns or scaling laws that develop”
as newly ordered systems emerge (2000, p. 30). Many
complex systems tend to be self-similar across levels.
That is, the same dynamics drive order-creation behav-
iors at multiple levels (West et al. 1997). These processes
are called scaling laws because they represent dynamics
appearing similarly at many orders of magnitude (Zipf
1949). We present ﬁfteen SF theories, arguing that most
apply to organizations. Gell-Mann (2002) argues that in
living systems, scalability and scaling laws are as impor-
tant a means of scientiﬁc explanation as is reductionism
and explanation via law-like equations.
We ﬁrst use ﬁndings from 141 kinds of power
laws from natural to social and organizational phe-
nomena to suggest the pervasiveness and importance
of power laws, which typically signify well-formed
rank/frequency Pareto distributions stemming from scal-
able causes. Next we classify 15 SF theories about scal-
able causal dynamics that apply to organizations, dis-
cussing several in detail. Then we switch to research
implications: How do theory and methods change if we
focus on rank/frequency Pareto distributions rather than
squeezing all organizational phenomena into normal dis-
tributions (or more broadly, distributions that rely on
ﬁnite variance)—as is currently the practice? Finally, we
discuss implications in terms of the basic predictor func-
tion, y = f x+ . How does basic thinking about pre-
diction, data, error terms, and statistics have to change?
A conclusion follows.
Entering the Third Phase of
Complexity Science
Background
Complexity science has emerged in three phases.
Energy: The ﬁrst phase appeared in Europe, led by
Nobel Laureate Ilya Prigogine (1955; Prigogine and
Stengers 1997). He built on Henri Bénard’s (1901) study
of emergent structures in ﬂuids. Because these serve
to dissipate energy imposing on a system, he labeled
them dissipative structures. This phase transition, which
occurs at the so-called ﬁrst critical value of imposed
energy, deﬁnes what we may call the edge of order.
Schieve and Allen (1981), Haken (1983, 2004), Nicolis
and Prigogine (1989), and Mainzer (2007) continue this
line of work.
Emergence: This phase was initiated by Nobel
Laureates Anderson (1972) and Gell-Mann (1988, 2002)
along with Holland (1988, 2002), Kauffman (1993), and
Arthur (1994) at the Santa Fe Institute. It is mostly ori-
ented toward biology and the social sciences—i.e., living
systems (Gell-Mann 2002). Its focus is on heterogeneous
agents interacting at what was early on called the edge
of chaos; this occurs at the second critical value of
imposed energy. In between the “edges” of order and
chaos is the region of emergent complexity, what Kauff-
man terms the melting zone (1993, p. 109). Bak (1996)
argued that to survive, organisms have to have a capa-
bility of staying within the melting zone, maintaining
themselves in a state of self-organized criticality, i.e.,
adaptive efﬁcacy. Holland (2002) deﬁnes emergent phe-
nomena as multi-level hierarchies, intra- and inter-level
causal processes, and nonlinearities. Nonlinearity incor-
porates two additional outcomes: the butterﬂy effect1 and
scalability. Stacey (1992), Goldstein (1994), and many
others apply complexity science to organization studies
(Maguire et al. 2006).
Scalability: Though beginning decades ago with
Pareto (1897), Auerbach (1913), and Zipf (1949), the
third phase—which includes econophysics (West and
Deering 1995, Mantegna and Stanley 2000)—focuses on
power-law phenomena (Newman 2005). Econophysics
began with Benoit Mandelbrot’s (1963a) focus on stock
market crashes. Although crashes are negative extreme
events, their showing the power-law signature indicates
that the markets were free to go up or down without
restraint. Power laws often appear as telltales of self-
organization, emergence-in-action, and self-organizing
economies (Krugman 1996).
If one plots a well-formed Pareto rank/frequency dis-
tribution with both x and y axes as log scales, a
negatively-sloped straight line will appear; this is the
inverse power-law signature. Power laws often take the
form of rank/frequency expressions such as F ∼ N−
,
where F is frequency, N is rank (the variable), and 
, the
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exponent, is constant.2 This is in contrast to “exponen-
tial” equations stated in terms of the natural log, e, where
the exponent is the variable and N is constant. Power
laws show potentially inﬁnite variance and an unstable
or nonexisting mean and are frequently “   indicative
of correlated, cooperative phenomena between groups
of interacting agents    ” (Cook et al. 2004)—but not
always, as we will point out below. Andriani and
McKelvey (2007a) present more than 80 kinds of power
laws (with sources)—16 physical; 24 biological; 21
social; and 23 pertaining to economic, business, and
organizational phenomena. We show an expanded list of
101 social and organizational power laws in Table 1.
Power laws indicate long-tailed Paretian rank/
frequency rather than “normal” Gaussian distributions—
see Figure 1. The difference lies in assumptions about
the correlations among events. In a Gaussian distri-
bution, data points are assumed independent-additive
(hereinafter simply independent). These events gener-
ate normal distributions, which sit at the heart of mod-
ern statistics. When causal elements are independent-
multiplicative, a lognormal distribution results, which
turns into a Pareto distribution as the causal complex-
ity increases (West and Deering 1995)—detailed below.
When events are interdependent, interactive, or both,
normality in distributions is not the norm. Instead, Pareto
distributions dominate because positive feedback (and
other) processes leading to extreme events occur more
frequently than “normal” Gaussian-based statistics lead
us to expect. Further, as tension imposed on the data
points increases to the limit, they can shift from inde-
pendent to interdependent (Boisot and McKelvey 2007).
Phase three brings a totally new look to organizational
applications of complexity science: (1) power laws as
indicators of effective emergence-in-action, (2) SF theo-
ries as explanations of the underlying SF causal dynam-
ics, and (3) Holland’s “levers” as managerial action tools
to foster scalable dynamics.
From Reductionism to a New Regularity: Scalability
Brock (2000, p. 29) says,
The study of complexity   is the study of how a very
complicated set of equations can generate some very
simple patterns for certain parameter values. Complex-
ity considers whether these patterns have a property of
universality about them. Here we will call these patterns
scaling laws.
The increasing discovery of power laws brings scal-
ability and SF theories to prominence (Newman
2005). Many complex systems—resulting from emer-
gent dynamics—tend to be self-similar across levels.
That is, the same process drives order-creation behav-
iors across multiple levels of an emergent system (Casti
1994, West et al. 1997). These processes are called scal-
ing laws because they represent empirically discovered
system attributes applying similarly across many orders
of magnitude (Zipf 1949). Scalability occurs when the
appearance of phenomena is independent of the scale
used to measure them (inches, feet, yards, miles) or the
same causal dynamic operates at multiples levels.
Gell-Mann (2002) deﬁnes “effective complexity” as
regularities or “schema” found or judged to be useful.
For him, they appear as equations, genotypes, laws and
traditions, and business best practices. What is new is
Gell-Mann’s recognition of a new regularity. In doing
so, he sets forth two regularities:
Type 1. Reductionist Law-Like Regularities: The old
simplicity of reductionist causal processes of normal
science, which are predictable and easily represented
by equations—the data and information much preferred
in classical physics and neoclassical economics (2002,
p. 19). These are the point attractors of chaos theory—
deﬁned by forces, energy conservation, and equilibrium.
Type 2. Multilevel SF Regularities: The new simplic-
ity of insigniﬁcant initiating events—what we call butter-
ﬂy events. Outcomes over time that result from an accu-
mulation of often random tiny initiating events that have
lasting effects are compounded by positive-feedback
effects over time, and become frozen accidents (2002,
p. 20). These are the strange attractors and fractals of
chaos theory—never repeating, fostering indeterminacy,
and offering a different kind of regularity.
The ﬁrst process generates regularities characteriz-
ing existing empirical organization and management
research. These may be conﬁdently described via Gaus-
sian statistics and allow predictions that become the
basis of schemata and prescriptive solutions. They are
the basis of “reductionist” science—using components
to explain a more macro level of behavior. The second
focuses on the effects of tiny initiating butterﬂy events.
The butterﬂy events of chaotic histories are seldom
repeated, are not predictable, and can produce signiﬁcant
nonlinear outcomes that may become extreme events.
Consequently, descriptions of these systems are at best
problematic and easily outside the explanatory/scientiﬁc
traditions of normal science. Gell-Mann concludes by
noting that when butterﬂy events spiral up such that their
effects appear at multiple levels and are magniﬁed, we
see self-similarity, scalability, and power laws.
Underlying most power laws is a causal dynamic
explained via SF theories. Each theory points to a sin-
gle pervasive generative cause to explain the dynamics
at each of however many levels at which the scalability
effect applies. SF theories yield what Gell-Mann (1988,
p. 3) refers to as deep simplicity. Whereas tradition rests
on the idea that lower-level dynamics can explain and
predict higher-level phenomena and simplicity comes in
the form of (usually) linear mathematical equations—
i.e., reductionism (Gell-Mann 2002)—SF theories point
to the same causes operating at multiple levels—the
“simplicity” is one theory explaining dynamics at multi-
ple levels. SF causes are Holland’s levers. “  Almost all
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Figure 1 Gaussian vs. Pareto Distributions
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Power law
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CAS [complex adaptive systems] exhibit lever point phe-
nomena, where ‘inexpensive’ inputs cause major directed
effects in the CAS dynamics” (2002, p. 29). These levers
trigger butterﬂy effects across multiple levels.
Explaining via SF Theories
Along with those areas mentioned earlier, researchers
ﬁnd power laws in social networks, industry sec-
tors, growth rates of ﬁrms, bankruptcies, transition
economies, drug and movie proﬁts, sales decays, and
economic ﬂuctuations—see Table 1. Power laws are
mostly explained by SF theories. We identify 15 SF the-
ories applying to organizations—see Table 2. We believe
that the following logic chain applies:
1. Successful emergence results in fractals, SF
dynamics, and power laws explainable via SF theory.
2. Power laws are far more ubiquitous than heretofore
realized and are usually indicators of SF dynamics.
3. Consequently, SF dynamics are also ubiquitous;
many SF theories seemingly apply to organizations.
4. If power laws are not obviously evident in organi-
zations, then emergence has failed to emerge.
5. Therefore, organization-relevant complexity theory
and research have to apply scalability dynamics.
Two new complexity thrusts are identiﬁable. First,
roughly one-third of complexity science theory is miss-
ing in organizational and managerial applications to
date, i.e., the scalability phase—power laws and the
underlying fractals, scalability, and SF theory. Organi-
zations are multilevel phenomena. Almost by deﬁni-
tion we can take power-law signatures as the best evi-
dence we have that emergence dynamics are operating
at multiple organizational levels. We now know for
sure that power laws apply at the overall industry level
(Stanley et al. 1996, Axtell 2001) and industry sectors
(Aoyama et al. 2009, Glaser 2009), with some appear-
ing within ﬁrms. If power laws are not evident in a
particular ﬁrm, we can only conclude that emergence,
if it exists at all, is not multilevel. Building from the
interacting food-web literature (Pimm 1982, Solé et al.
2001, Cuddington and Yodzis 2002, Sims et al. 2008),
we can also surmise that absent the power-law signa-
ture, a ﬁrm’s emergence dynamics are not capable of
keeping it competitive with its changing competitors,
suppliers, and customers (McKelvey et al. 2009). The
bottom line is that power laws are signiﬁcant indica-
tors of crucially important managerial and organizational
dynamics.
Second, organization change and entrepreneurship
researchers should be especially interested in SF dynam-
ics and related theories. Who more than entrepreneurs
wouldn’t like to let loose SF dynamics in their ﬁrms?
Think of how many small entrepreneurial ventures stay
that way simply because the emergent growth dynamics
they had at the one- or two-level size failed to scale up
as levels increased. Think how many large organizations
show failing intrapreneurship for the same reason—the
hundreds of “butterﬂy ideas” never become meaning-
ful butterﬂy events, never produce butterﬂy effects, and
never spiral into multilevel SF causal dynamics produc-
ing power-law signatures. Jean-Pierre Garnier, CEO of
GlaxoSmithKline says:
  Size is a problem early in the drug-development pro-
cess. “Drug ﬁnders” and innovators may well get tripped
up by bureaucracy and tangled in red tape; good ideas
are lost. Even worse, bad ideas may not be weeded out
in time. (The Economist 2007, p. 57)
Complexity theory applied to organizations is silent on
the foregoing points. One important move we recom-
mend now is to learn how to apply SF complexity
theories to organization change, organizational develop-
ment, and entrepreneurship/intrapreneurship and strat-
egy. Teaching and preaching complexity theory is out of
date in our organizational world, absent SF theory. These
points are further elaborated in Andriani and McKelvey
(2007a, 2009) and Boisot and McKelvey (2007).
Causes of Power Laws in Organizations
Of the many kinds of power laws we list in Table 1,
more than 50 are associated speciﬁcally with ﬁrms and
organizational processes. Some of the power laws in
Andriani and McKelvey: Perspective
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Table 1 Some Examples of Social and Organizational Power-Law Phenomena
1. Size of nations by population (Buldyrev et al. 2003)
2. Fractal structure of hunter/gatherer social networks
(Hamilton et al. 2007).
3. Hierarchy of social group size (Zhou et al. 2005)
4. Economic ﬂuctuations (Scheinkman and Woodford 1994)
5. Growth rate of countries’ GDP (Lee et al. 1998)
6. Duration of recessions (Ormerod and Mounﬁeld 2001)
7. Recessions and prosperity in Latin America
(Redelico et al. 2008)
8. Transition economies (Podobnik et al. 2006)
9. Distribution of wealth (Pareto 1897, Levy and Solomon 1997)
10. Financial crashes (Sornette 2003)
11. Casualties in war (Cederman 2003)
12. Political complexity in communities (Carneiro 1987)
13. Size of cities (Zipf 1949)
14. Area, height, volume, size of buildings (Batty et al. 2008)
15. Costs of homeless in cities (Gladwell 2006)
16. Number of religious adherents (Clauset et al. 2007)
17. Price movements on exchanges (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004)
18. Scientiﬁc discoveries (Plerou et al. 1999)
19. Copies of books sold (Hackett 1967)
20. Cascades in book sales (Sornette et al. 2004)
21. Sales of fast moving consumer goods (Moss 2002)
22. Movie proﬁts (De Vany 2003)
23. Market share distribution of UK retail outlets (Moss 2002)
24. Cotton prices (Mandelbrot 1963a)
25. Blockbuster drugs (Buchanan 2004)
26. Wealth distribution of investors (Solomon and Richmond 2001)
27. Saving effects on wealth distribution (Patriarca et al. 2006)
28. Medieval wealth distribution (Hegyi et al. 2007)
29. Job vacancies (Gunz et al. 2001)
30. Changing language (Dahui et al. 2005)
31. Deaths of languages (Abrams and Strogatz 2003)
32. Social networks (Watts 2003)
33. Sexual networks (Liljeros et al. 2001)
34. Social inﬂuence (Castellano et al. 2000)
35. Coauthorships (Newman 2001)
36. Publications and citations (Lotka 1926, deSolla Price 1965)
37. Actor networks (Barabási and Bonabeau 2003)
38. Scale-free business networks (Souma et al. 2006)
39. Number of inventions in cities (Bettencourt et al. 2007)
40. Trafﬁc jams (Nagel and Paczuski 1995)
41. Frequency of family names (Zanette and Manrubia 2001)
42. Global terrorism events (Dumé 2005)
43. Revenues of top 500 Chinese ﬁrms (Zhang et al. 2009)
44. Learning rates in heart surgery (Huesch 2009)
45. Firm size (Axtell 2001)
46. Firm size, interﬁrm relationships (Saito et al. 2007)
47. Growth rate: Japanese SIC industries (Ishikawa 2006)
48. Growth rates by sales: internal structure of ﬁrms (Stanley et al. 1996)
49. Growth rates: universities, countries (Stanley et al. 2000)
50. Economic effects of zero-rational agents (Ormerod et al. 2005)
51. Delinquency rates (Cook et al. 2004)
52. Aggressive behavior among boys (Warren et al. 2005)
53. Supply chains (Scheinkman and Woodford 1994)
54. Complex product development
(Braha and Bar-Yam 2007)
55. Bankruptcy of ﬁrms (Fujiwara 2004)
56. Robustness in organizational networks
(Dodds et al. 2003)
57. Learning strategy (Delaney et al. 1998)
58. Cognitive skills: “power law of practice”
(Newell and Rosenbloom 1981)
59. Number of phone calls, emails (Aiello et al. 2000)
60. Website hits per day (Adamic and Huberman 2000)
61. News website visitation decay (Dezsõ et al. 2005)
62. “Fordist” power (Diatlov 2005)
63. Alliance networks among biotech ﬁrms
(Barabási and Bonabeau 2003)
64. Branch networks of Polish ﬁrms
(Chmiel et al. 2007)
65. Worldwide investment networks (Song et al. 2009)
66. Antibody alliances in biotech
(Gay and Dousset 2005)
67. “Power curves” in U.S. industries (Zanini 2008)
68. Entrepreneurship/innovation (Poole et al. 2000)
69. Italian industrial districts (Andriani 2003)
70. Mergers and acquisitions waves (Park 2009)
71. Director interlock structure (Battiston
and Catanzaro 2004)
72. Microsoft’s ecosystem (Data from Iansiti and
Levien 2004; additional analysis by Colon Drayton)
73. Market capitalization in industries (Glaser 2009)
74. Earnings, multilevel marketing by ﬁrms
(Legara et al. 2008)
75. Biotech networks (Powell et al. 2005)
76. Growth of ﬁrms (Lee et al. 1998)
77. Productivity of innovation (Jones 2005)
78. Work incapacity from back pain (Schmid 2004)
79. Intra-ﬁrm decision events (Diatlov 2005)
80. Type of political ofﬁcers, size of community
(Johnson 1982)
81. Decision making and queuing (Barabási 2005)
82. Physical space, long-tail analysis
(Bentley et al. 2008)
83. Japanese (J.) incomea
84. J. income tax 1887–2003
85. J. ﬁrms’ sales
86. J. ﬁrms’ proﬁt
87. J. company income
88. J. iron/steel fabrication sector
89. J. electrical machinery sector
90. J. wholesale sector
91. J. steel, other metals sector
92. J. general machinery sector
93. J. chemical, petroleum products sector
94. J. retail trade sector
95. France: size by total assets
96. France: size by sales in France
97. UK: size by total assets
98. UK: size by number of employees
99. Italy: size by total assets
100. Italy: size by sales in Italy
101. Italy: size by number of employees
aThe source of the power-law distributions from 80–98 is H. Aoyama et al. (2009). Similar distributions have been found in many other
industrialized countries—see for instance Gaffeo et al. (2003).
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Table 2 Empirical Basis of Scale-Free Causes of Power Laws
Rules Explanation
1. Surface-volume law Organisms; villages: In organisms, surfaces absorbing energy grow by the square but the
organism grows by the volume, resulting in an imbalance (Carneiro 1987); fractals emerge to
bring surface/volume back into balance. West and Brown 2004 show that several phenomena
in biology such as metabolic rate, height of trees, life span, etc., are described by an allometric
power law whose exponent is a multiple of ±1/4. The cause is fractal distribution of resources.
Allometric power laws hold across 27 orders of magnitude of mass.
2. Random walk Coin ﬂipping; gambler’s ruin: Given a stochastic process such as coin ﬂipping and, say, two
players with a ﬁnite number of pennies to gamble, the probability that eventually one of the
players will lose all his/her pennies is 100% (Kraitchik 1942). Number of tosses required is
Pareto distributed (Newman 2005).
3. Hierarchical modularity Growth unit connectivity: As cell ﬁssion occurs by the square, and connectivity increases by
[n(n–1)/2], producing an imbalance between the gains from ﬁssion versus the cost of maintaining
connectivity; consequently, organisms form modules or cells so as to reduce the cost of
connectivity; Simon argued that adaptive advantage goes to “nearly decomposable” systems
(Simon 1962).
4. Event bursts Activity prioritization: Individuals show bursts of communication, entertainment, and work activities
followed by long delays, as opposed to random (Poisson) distribution (Barabási 2005).
5. Combination theory Number of exponentials; complexity: Multiple exponential or lognormal distributions or increased
complexity of components (subtasks, processes) sets up, which results in a power-law
distribution (West and Deering 1995, Newman 2005).
6. Interactive breakage theory Wealth; mass extinctions/explosions: A few independent elements having multiplicative effects
produce lognormals; if the elements become interactive with positive-feedback loops materializing,
a power law results; based on Kolmogorov’s “breakage theory” of wealth creation (1941).
7. Interacting fractals Food web; ﬁrm and industry size: The fractal structure of a species is based on the food web
(S. Pimm quoted in Lewin 1992, p. 121), which is a function of the fractal structure of predators
and niche resources (Preston 1948, Pimm 1982, Solé et al. 2001, West 2006).
8. Least effort Language; transition: Word frequency is a function of ease of usage by both speaker/writer and
listener/reader; this gives rise to Zipf’s power law, now found to apply to language, ﬁrms,
and economies in transition (Zipf 1949, Ishikawa 2006, Podobnik et al. 2006).
9. Preferential attachment Nodes; gravitational attraction: Given newly arriving agents into a system, larger nodes with an
enhanced propensity to attract agents will become disproportionately even larger, resulting
in the power-law signature (Barabási 2002, Newman 2005).
10. Spontaneous order creation Heterogeneous agents seeking out other agents to copy/learn from so as to improve ﬁtness
generate networks; there is some probability of positive feedback such that some networks
become groups, and some groups form larger groups and hierarchies (Kauffman 1993,
Holland 1995).
11. Irregularity generated gradients Coral growth; blockages: Starting with a random, insigniﬁcant irregularity, coupled with positive
feedback, the initial irregularity starts an autocatalytic process driven by emergent energy
gradients, which results in the emergence of a niche. This explains the growth of coral reefs
and innovation systems (Turner 2000, Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
12. Phase transition Turbulent ﬂows: Exogenous energy impositions cause autocatalytic, interaction effects and
percolation transitions at a speciﬁc energy level—the ﬁrst critical value—such that new
interaction groupings form with a Pareto distribution (Prigogine 1955, Nicolis and Prigogine
1989).
13. Contagion bursts Epidemics; idea contagion: Often, viruses are spread exponentially—each person coughs upon
two others and the network expands geometrically. But changing rates of contagious ﬂow
of viruses, stories, and metaphors, because of changing settings such as almost empty or
very crowded rooms and airplanes, result in bursts of contagion or spreading via increased
interactions; these avalanches result in the power-law signature (Watts 2003, Baskin 2005)
due to the small-world structures of the transient underlying networks.
14. Self-organized criticality Sandpiles; forests; heartbeats: Under constant tension of some kind gravity (ecological balance,
delivery of oxygen), some systems reach a critical state where they maintain adaptive stasis
by preservative behaviors—such as sand avalanches, forest ﬁres, changing heartbeat rate,
species adaptation—which vary in size of effect according to a power law (Bak 1996).
15. Niche proliferation Markets; when production, distribution, and search become cheap and easily available, markets
develop a long tail of proliferating niches containing fewer and fewer customers; they become
Paretian with mass market products at one end and a long tail of niches of the other
(Anderson 2006).
Note. Additional power law causes are mentioned in West and Deering (1995), Sornette (2000), and Newman (2005).
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broader social phenomena also apply to organizations.
These discoveries of organization-relevant power laws
offer substantial evidence that well-formed Pareto distri-
butions are everyday organizational phenomena. Given
this, two questions follow:
1. What causes power laws in organizations and what
theories might explain the causes?
2. To what extent does the existence of power laws
undermine prevailing assumptions that organizational
phenomena are linear, equilibrium-seeking, and nor-
mally distributed?
In this section, we respond to the ﬁrst question by
arguing that SF theories apply to organizations.
Classifying Scale-Free Theories About Causes of
Power Laws
We have assembled enough SF theories that a classiﬁca-
tion of them seems relevant, as follows:
1. Ratio Imbalances—Theories 1–4: In each, the basic
SF cause is some kind of ‘cost-driven efﬁciency requir-
ing constant or periodic adjustment:
2. Multiple Distributions—Theories 5–7: Here the SF
cause of long tails is some kind of combination in the
form of p(y∼ eabcd ···n, where the distributions under-
lying variables a, b, c, d · · ·n are somewhat skewed and
tainted with outliers. The multiplicative effect of the
outliers progresses into a long-tailed Pareto distribution
(West and Deering 1995).
3. Positive Feedback—Theories 8–11: In some sys-
tems the initial interaction possibilities are such that
there is the possibility, if not probability, of positive-
feedback spirals emerging simply as time progresses.
The underlying SF cause is some probability that but-
terﬂy events will mutually interact so as to spiral up to
produce long-tailed distributions.
4. Contextual Effects—Theories 12–15: Exogenous
effects set SF dynamics in motion. In this set, different
kinds of imposing effects set off SF causal processes.
The common effect is context, but in each case the con-
textual effect is different and acts to set off a different
kind of SF dynamic.
The deﬁnition and discipline base of each theory are
given in Table 2. Ours is the ﬁrst actual classiﬁcation
of this many theories about SF causes—most publica-
tions don’t mention any SF cause; some mention one.
Newman (2005) emphasizes preferential attachment and
self-organized criticality, with minor reference to a few
other physical ones (see also Sornette 2000). There are
a few we don’t include. Like the proliferation of power
law discoveries, the growing set of SF theories makes it
harder and harder not to wonder if they don’t also apply
to organizational phenomena.
Do Scale-Free Theories Apply to Organizations?
In Andriani and McKelvey (2007b) we make shorter
arguments as to how most of the SF theories in Table 2
apply to organizations. Although each is brieﬂy deﬁned
in Table 2, we discuss ﬁve of them here in more depth.
Square-cube/quarter-power. In biology, many scaling
laws take the allometric form Y ∼Mb, where Y is some
observable and M the mass of the organism. Allomet-
ric refers to a type of growth in which the parts of
an organism grow at different rates determined by ﬁxed
ratios. Among these, West et al. (1997) cite metabolic
rate, height of trees, life span, growth rate, heart rate,
DNA nucleotide substitution rate, lengths of aortas, size
of genomes, mass of cerebral gray matter, and density of
mitochondria. In organisms, surfaces absorbing energy
grow by the square but the organism grows by the vol-
ume, resulting in an imbalance. By adaptation, fractal
structures emerge to keep surface absorption of energy
in balance with the volume’s use of energy. But energy
is moved from surface to places in the volume by capil-
laries and other tubes in which ﬂuid ﬂows are governed
by the quarter-power law. By nature, organisms adapt in
a fashion such that quarter, square, and cube capacities
are appropriately balanced. They are allometric’3 scaling
laws because they set up rigid relationships.
Allometric growth reﬂects universal structural con-
straints in the way organisms use energy. The emerging
ﬁeld of allometric growth (Whitﬁeld 2006) is redeﬁning
biology and more in general the study about how ecosys-
tems self-organize around fundamental energetic con-
straints. Insofar as organizational ecosystems use energy
and energy-related quantities (money is the equivalent of
energy according to some economists—see for instance
Beinhocker 2007) and conform to general principles of
ecosystem organization, we expect the study of allomet-
ric growth to yield compelling inputs to organization
science.
Firms operate in ecosystems deﬁned by the need to
maximize revenues (exchange area between ﬁrm and
customers) and minimize expenses (energy spent for
developing, manufacturing, and distributing products). If
this revenue-energy constraint can be given a meaning-
ful geometric economic form, we may discover similar
allometric relationships in many organizations. We now
present some initial ﬁndings.
Haire (1959) ﬁrst applied the square-cube law success-
fully to four ﬁrms. Levy and Donhowe (1962) conﬁrmed
his ﬁndings in 62 ﬁrms in eight industries. Stephan
(1983) applied the square-cube law to ﬁrms in terms
of effectiveness. Employees dealing with people out-
side the ﬁrm are “surface” employees—they bring in
the resources from the environment. “Volume” employ-
ees are those inside who produce and coordinate. As
ﬁrms grow, then, they have to maintain the square-cube
ratio by adding more surface units or making them more
efﬁcient.
Carneiro (1987) applies the law to explain the upper
bound on the size of villages. The law limits their size
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unless they develop what he terms “structural complex-
ity,” where complexity grows at two-thirds power of
a village’s population. Only by doing this do villages
avoid splitting in two. Carneiro’s theory is more general
than Stephan’s; Carneiro says social entities can increase
in size only by building in structural complexity. In his
data, for example, 100-person villages had 10 “complex-
ity traits” whereas 1,000-person villages had four to ﬁve
times as many. Johnson (1982), studying the governance
of primitive organizations, ﬁnds that organizational com-
plexity and leadership diversity scale accordingly with
the allometric principles mentioned above. Much like
Carneiro, Johnson ﬁnds that the emergence of nested
hierarchical systems seems to be a response to the scalar
stress induced by the exponential increase in the num-
ber of communication channels among the parts of the
organization. The number of communication channels
scale exponentially with the volume of the organization.
A scalar stress increase forces the organization to elab-
orate more complex hierarchical systems with the effect
of keeping scalar stress under control. By doing so, the
organization changes the surface-volume ratio. From the
point of view of the square-cube law, a decentralized net-
work organization is a way to transform a large portion
of the organizational employees into surface employees,
thereby correcting scalar stress and bringing the sur-
face/volume tension in line with allometric growth—but
still subject to the quarter-power law.
The quarter-power law applies to the supply chain
materials-ﬂow “tube” that limits both the size of a sup-
plier and retailer, for example. Zara is a retailer of new
high-fashion designs—three weeks from models in the
designer’s mind to new fashions in its stores. How?
By bringing manufacturing from China back to Europe,
thereby shorting the “ﬂuid” ﬂow of clothing in trans-
portation corridors and long-distance design communi-
cations. The primary factor in the virtual collapse of
Citigroup stems from its “silo” design (Moore 2008).
None of its employees having diverse vantage points of
observations of its activities leading up to the subprime
meltdown were connected to useful communication ﬂow
channels—no part of the ﬁrm could readily learn from
any of the other parts.4 One could call this “a total
quarter-power breakdown.”
Combination and Breakage Theories. Kolmogorov
(1941) originally applied his “breakage theory” to
coal—when large chunks of coal were smashed so as
to be used in furnaces, resulting in small chunks down
to powder—they appeared Pareto distributed. We now
see Pareto distributions and power laws in chromosome
breakage (Pevzner and Tesler 2003) and hydrodynamics
(Bache 2004). In organizations the simple breaking up
of ﬁrms into nearly autonomous modular designs makes
breakage theory applicable—an approach dating back to
Simon’s (1962) “nearly decomposable” systems theory.
Oppositely, combination theory holds that the require-
ment for a power law to emerge is the number of
elements in a complex system and their propensity to
interact with one another. West and Deering (1995) and
Newman (2005) both make the case that the combina-
tion of exponents results in a power-law distribution—
the more of them that are combined, the more obvious
the power law. Of course it does at the equation level, but
what interacting non-normal phenomena actually occur
in organizations?
If several organizational components or behaviors
appearing vertically across several levels individually
generate non-normal distributions having somewhat
longer tails, and also inﬂuence each other, then combi-
nation theory tells us that organizations are inevitably
going to contain well-formed Pareto distributions and
show the power-law signature. Because they appear
across several vertical levels, there is also a high prob-
ability that fractal structures and scalable causes are
present—unless, of course, there are explicit attempts
by management to negate them. In combination the-
ory, the occurrence of interaction is taken as a naturally
inherent likelihood as systems become more complex.
Because many larger organizations have many degrees
of freedom—and thus are complex by deﬁnition—they
will show Pareto distributions, as is preliminarily evident
in our Table 1.
As it has been applied to wealth (Montroll and Badger
1974), breakage theory appears as a set of independent-
multiplicative elements that are lognormally distributed
(West and Deering 1995, p. 152). To be wealthy, an
individual has to have some minimum level of speciﬁed
kinds of attributes (elements). The eight elements are
social background, education, personality type, technical
ability, communication skills, motivation, right place-
right time, willing to take risks. But social background,
education, technical ability, communication, and being
in the right place at the right time are all potentially
interactive, with an embedded positive-feedback effect—
e.g., for a family, the more social status, education,
and technical skills, then over time, the more technical
skills, the more social status, etc. Now in the business
world, suppose that some set of elements are required
in organizations to cause the GEs, Microsofts, Toy-
otas, and Wal-Marts of this world—say CEO skills, the
right industry, new technology, “star” employees, spe-
cial markets, weak competitors, borrowing ability, etc.
As these and other elements become more complexly
interactive with positive-feedback effects, the distribu-
tion of ﬁrms changes from lognormal to Pareto. Axtell’s
(2001) research shows that this is, indeed, how U.S.
industry appears.
Least effort. Zipf (1949) argued that least effort
explained his Zipf’s Law—a power law of word usage
in English, French, and Spanish. The ﬁrst question is,
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what is least-effort? Consider: Why would you learn
words we don’t use? Why would we use words you
don’t understand? In both cases it is wasted effort. Least-
effort theory holds that each of us will minimize down
to the only words relevant for meaningful transaction.
For example, the 1953 Merriam-Webster’s unabridged
dictionary had more than 550,000 words; by 1971 it was
reduced to about $450,000 words. Merriam-Webster’s
collegiate dictionary that most of us have in our ofﬁces
is abridged down to around 86,000 words. The Harper-
Collins Italian-English dictionary contains some 28,000
English words. We get by with fewer and fewer words.
Why is word usage Pareto distributed? Why are
words like the, of, and, and so on at the top of the
rank/frequency distribution? These words have to ﬁt in
with both the “before” words and the “after” words.
Adjectives and adverbs, however, only have to ﬁt with
“after” words. Some words with narrow technical means
are seldom used—the word “unabridged” is used only
once in this paper until this sentence. High usage
brought more opportunities, historically, for more pro-
posed usages and more chances for disagreement on
word usage. Higher usage also brings more opportunities
for least-effort movements to improve efﬁciency. The
result is increased demand for least effort and greater
payoff. In word usage, then, we have an interactive
market transaction of word usage that slowly works
toward increased efﬁciency. The basic dynamic is a cir-
cular, positive-feedback process where each party moves
toward the maximum efﬁciency, least-effort attractor
basin. It is the opposite of the other positive-feedback
SF theories.
To make least-effort theory even more compelling
and applicable to organizations, we ﬁnd that it has now
shown to be especially characteristic of changing cir-
cumstances. Four recent studies suggest that Zipf’s Law
appears predominantly in the context of change:
1. In testing whether Zipf’s Law applies to Chinese as
well as English, Dahui et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the power-
law signature applies only during the period before
Emperor Qin Shihuang’s uniﬁcation (about 1720), when
Chinese characters were in ﬂux. They conclude that the
law does not apply when the number of characters is
stable.
2. Ishikawa (2006) shows that Pareto’s law holds
when applied to ﬁrms in less populated JSIC5 two-digit
categories (having fewer ﬁrms) where growth rate is
high, but a lognormal distribution applies to ﬁrms in
large categories (ﬁlled with ﬁrms) where growth rate is,
therefore, low.
3. Dahui et al. (2006) use two computational network
models to show that the distribution of ﬁrms in growth
markets is a power law but in markets without growth it
is Gamma or exponential. They conclude, “  we can-
not get [a] power-law distribution by preferential attach-
ment in a constant market     Economic growth is an
important condition for the power-law distribution of
ﬁrm size   ” (pp. 363–364).
4. Podobnik et al. (2006) ﬁnd empirically—and
test further with a computational model—that time-
series indices in transition economies (i.e., Hungary,
Russia, Slovenia, etc.) ﬁt Paretian rather than Gaussian
distributions.
Three of the foregoing studies apply to organizations
or markets.
Preferential attachment. This positive-feedback pro-
cess (Barabási 2002) underlies biological and social net-
works, going from groups of individuals to groups of
organizations. The Internet grows according to prefer-
ential attachment (Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2003). The
same happens with cities and airport hubs—as nodes
grow they attract even more people or ﬂights (Barabási
2002). Internet marketing and sales are very much a
positive-feedback process (Gladwell 2000). Any time
a system grows by adding nodes to an existing net-
work, the nodes’ growth will amplify historically gen-
erated imbalances among the links. Absent top-down
regulation, older or larger nodes will gain more links
and generate a Pareto distribution—as in the biotech
industry (Powell et al. 2005, Gay and Dousset 2005).
Because organizations are made of social networks, pref-
erential attachment plays a crucial role in their forma-
tion and evolution, thereby providing a solid base for
a network-based theory of organizational formation and
development. This “rich get richer” dynamic explains
the emergence of central hubs and peripheral groups
that characterize the geography of most organizations
and the inherent concentration (and dispersion) of deci-
sion making. Other examples are Arthur’s (1994) study
of increasing returns—ﬁrms making proﬁts can invest
in things that make even more proﬁts. Microsoft is a
good modern example, as is Wal-Mart; the more it low-
ers prices, the more people come to buy; the more they
come to buy, the more Wal-Mart can lower prices. And
the more Wal-Mart sells, the more pressure it can put
on suppliers to lower prices; the more they lower prices,
the more Wal-Mart can sell.
Self-organized criticality (SOC). This theory is sym-
bolized by Bak’s (1996) and others’ (Frigg 2003)
sandpile experiments. A sandpile subjected to an
inﬁnitesimal external perturbation (sequentially adding
single grains of irregularly edged sand) evolves toward a
critical state, characterized by a critical slope, whereby
any additional grain induces a systemic sand movement
reaction that can span any order of magnitude (from
one grain to thousands), with a frequency distribution
expressed by a power law. This is counterintuitive. We
generally assume a linear relationship between pertur-
bation size and a system’s reaction, i.e., small causes
yield small effects. This is true before SOC is attained.
Thus before criticality, each falling grain has a constant
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probability of displacing an adjacent grain. The proba-
bility of an avalanche therefore scales exponentially with
the number of sand grains. This makes large avalanches
highly unlikely. However, at criticality a power-law dis-
tribution results, given the global connectivity of the
irregularly edged grains making up the sandpile. As Bak
(1996, p. 60) writes, “In the critical state, the sand-
pile is the functional unit, not the grain of sand.” SOC
dynamics arise when an emergent system of links con-
nects local pockets into a coevolving whole such that
small and local ﬂuctuations may be ampliﬁed to achieve
systemic effects. More generally, as the tension in the
system increases to the SOC limit (usually as a result
of externally imposed tension—in Bak’s SOC this is a
function of gravity and accumulating sand grains) inde-
pendent data points become interdependent. Mathemat-
ically this means that sandpile behavior obeys a power
law of the type F ∼ S−, where F represents avalanche
frequency with given size, S.
From the dynamics of earthquakes (Gutenberg and
Richter 1944) and booms and busts in economic cycles
(Sornette 2003, Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004, Malev-
ergne and Sornette 2006) to the dynamics of supply
chains (Scheinkman and Woodford 1994, Wycisk et al.
2008), a common pattern appears across disparate ﬁelds.
Many systems exist in the state of criticality—on the
critical slope, as it were. Bak argues that all systems in
efﬁcaciously adaptive states are in the state of criticality.
Needless to say, then, SOC occurs frequently in mar-
kets and organizations (Buchanan 2000). Arguing that
individual decisions are sticky like irregular sand grains,
Bak applies SOC to economies. Because the tension
between supply and demand builds and the actions to
reduce it are not of equal size or regularity, free market
economies operate at or near the critical state. Economic
ﬂuctuations (business cycles) are SOC (Scheinkman and
Woodford 1994). We see SOC in the price of cotton and
ﬁnancial markets (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004): many
small changes in the price of stocks and the overall value
of the market separated by volatility incidents averag-
ing one in every four years from 1950 to 1980 and one
every two years since 1980.6 We also see SOC in con-
sumer product sales (Moss 2002, Sornette et al. 2004)
and managerial actions leading to different sized ﬁrms
(Stanley et al. 1996, 2000)—all of which show power
law signatures.
In the foregoing we detail how ﬁve SF theories apply
to organizations. Elsewhere we argue that almost all
apply (Andriani and McKelvey 2007b). Thus we have
potentially 15 reasons why organization scientists should
take as their new null hypothesis (Alderson 2008) the
reality that organizations and managers very often live
in a world of interdependent and not independent events;
a world of Pareto distributions, fractals, and power laws;
not Gaussian distributions where stable averages and
ﬁnite variances across large samples are what count.
Yes, we agree that there are many times and places
where Gaussian statistics apply, but it is simply wrong
to assume that they are the rule. If it is explicitly shown
that a normal distribution holds, use Gaussian statistics.
But absent this, the new null hypothesis should be pre-
sumed to apply.
Some Research Implications
All the world believes it [Gaussian distribution] ﬁrmly,
because the mathematicians imagine that it is a fact of
observation and the observers that it is a theorem of
mathematics. (Henry Poincaré 1913)7
We now offer Pareto driven alternatives, starting from
a discussion of the predictor function. Take a standard
predictor function consisting of a dependent variable, y,
several independent or explanatory variables, xn, and an
error term, : Thus y = f x1, x2, x3,     xn + .
There are two concerns when one shifts from a
Gaussian to a Paretian perception of data: (1) What hap-
pens to the predictor function? and (2) What happens to
the error term? Organizational researchers using statis-
tics as their basis of making truth claims—usually trans-
lated as ﬁndings signiﬁcant at p < 005 or < 001—
generally use statistical methods calling for Gaussian
distributions.
For instance, Greene’s textbook, Econometric Analysis
(2002), is in its ﬁfth edition and is the standard for many
econometricians and other social science researchers. He
begins his approximately 950 pages of analysis with lin-
ear multiple regression and its ﬁve endemic assumptions:
(1) independence among data points, (2) linear rela-
tionships among variables, (3) exogenous independent
variables, (4) homoscedasticity and nonautocorrelation,
and (5) normal distribution of error disturbances (p. 10).
Mostly his book focuses on how to make econometric
methods work when one or more of these assumptions
are untrue of the data. Given nonlinearity, for example,
Greene says, “by using logarithms, exponentials, recip-
rocals, transcendental functions, polynomials, products,
ratios, and so on, this ‘linear’ model can be tailored to
any number of situations” (p. 122). Regarding data dis-
tributions, he says (p. 105):
Large sample results suggest that although the usual
t and F statistics are still usable    they are viewed as
approximations whose quality improves as the sample
size increases     As n increases, the distribution   
converges exactly to a normal distribution.
Most standard econometric textbooks, such as Greene
(2002) and Kennedy (2003), present methods to trans-
form datasets into distributions with ﬁnite variance. Of
these, the normal distribution is by far the most used
due to its stability and conformance to the central limit
theorem. However, as Bartels (1977, p. 86) writes:
Economic data are seldom plentiful or accurate enough
to distinguish between a hypothesized normal population
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and a nonnormal stable one, and since such data are noto-
riously long-tailed it is difﬁcult to determine whether the
population variance is ﬁnite or not.
This is crucial: Mandelbrot (1963b) claims that reliance
on ﬁnite variance is the “Achilles heel” of econometrics.
Our Table 1 offers reasonable evidence that increasing
n may very well result in Pareto distributions—the Cen-
tral Limit Theorem (CLT) doesn’t apply! West (2007)
takes it a step further, saying that Pareto distributions
are so ubiquitous that ﬁnding a CLT-based average is
“exceptional!”
The various robustness8 tests standard economet-
ric textbooks discuss give evidence that modern-day
researchers have not taken on board Mandelbrot’s
(1963b, p. 438) plea:
There is strong pragmatic reason to begin the study of
economic distributions and time series by those that sat-
isfy the law of Pareto. Since this category includes prices,
ﬁrm sizes, and incomes, the study of Paretian laws is of
fundamental importance in economic statistics.
Let us put this in California earthquake terms—about
16,000 insigniﬁcant quakes occur every year and a
“really big one” once every 150–200 years, with 6- and
7-level quakes occurring within decades. If one sampled
California quakes from 1995 to 2006, all but two would
be in the 1–4 range: damage to no more than a few
houses; no one killed. But this would miss the recent
6- and 7-level quakes in urban areas (costing billions
of dollars and killing more than 100 people) and the
next level 8 yet to come. Californians have long con-
cluded that building codes should be based on the Pareto
rather than Gaussian perspective. If California followed
traditional econometric models, above, gathering more
data could make quakes appear even more normally dis-
tributed, which is surely not the case.
In effect, application of methods based on Gaussian
statistics (or more broadly on ﬁnite variance) models
would lead Californians building and living in high-
rise buildings to think that using a moving average of
quake variance over the thousands of harmless (average)
quakes would lead to effective building codes. Anyone
living through a signiﬁcant quake in California will tell
you this is nonsense. No amount of so-called “robustness
improvements” to the standard linear multiple regression
model allow it to model the effects of extreme quakes
on buildings, bridges, lives, and damage costs—i.e.,
the effects of fat-tailed Pareto distributions. Robustness
“solutions” cannot alter rank/frequency distributions to
conform to Gaussian assumptions.
The Predictor Function—From Gaussian to
Pareto Thinking
Consider the typical “linear” prediction: f x1, x2, x3,
    xn—the predictor function. Suppose we have a
simple explanatory theory based on three independent
variables: Experienced, skilled, and satisﬁed employees
increase output. Thus y = f x1, x2, x3 + . In mak-
ing a prediction like this, we usually think linearly—x
causes y. Furthermore, propositions and even operational
hypotheses appear in print with the expectation of a per-
fect correlation implicit—minus the effect of the error
term. We visualize this as an upward sloping line in the
wished-for plot of each cause of productivity, xn (above),
against output, y. Of course, the real world is never like
this, and so the plot of y by x1 data points, for example,
appears as almost a circle at worst (near zero correlation)
or a narrow ellipse at best—the thinner the better.
Two essential features are together the deﬁning ele-
ments of a “normal” Gaussian distribution:
1. The “mean” is stable and meaningful: In the equa-
tion y = f x+ , deﬁne y as weight and x as height.
Average weight of males in the United States is 190 lbs.;
average height is 5′86′′. Millions of men are at or very
near the mean.9
2. Variance is ﬁnite. Shortest living man is 2′5′′;
tallest is 7′10′′ (both in China); both are within 1/2
magnitude.
In Gaussian statistics some variance is essential, but
too much is a problem. Worse, if there is too much
variance, conﬁdence intervals widen and getting sta-
tistically signiﬁcant results is more problematic. In
our worker/output example, because human bodies are
involved, independence is reasonable: There will be
strong stable means of skill, experience, and satisfaction,
with enough variance around the mean to allow correla-
tions. But too little variance, and there is no meaningful
correlation; too much variance and there is less (or no)
chance for signiﬁcance.
As one moves away from a simple study of bod-
ies, such as our example—which is essentially where
statistics-applied-to-ﬁrms started half a century ago—
to study ﬁrms, distributions appear less obviously com-
posed of independent data points. As a result, some 70
years of advances in statistics (since the founding of
Econometrica in the early 1930s) offer devices econo-
metricians can use to get all the weird kinds of data
in the world of ﬁrms redesigned to ﬁt linear regression.
Now switch to a Paretian world. What changes? Con-
sider species and consumer products.
• At one end of a Pareto distribution we have hun-
dreds of elephants or Wal-Mart.
• At the other end we have trillions of mosquitoes or
millions of “Ma & Pa” stores (deﬁned as having no paid
employees).
Elephants are huge but mosquitoes are tiny. Elephants
eat vegetation, trample the land, and can trash your liv-
ing room; mosquitoes suck warm blood, ﬂy, and can give
you viral diseases. Wal-Mart is huge,10 enjoys substan-
tial bargaining power over its supply chain,11 and has
powerful lobbying abilities.12 Tiny Ma & Pa stores exist
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in microniches, buy supplies at the market, and have lit-
tle if any political power. The averages of these ends
of Pareto long tails are meaningless—Axtell (2008) says
a “typical ﬁrm” doesn’t exist! The mean, median, and
mode are different. A careful Gaussian study at the aver-
age or median may offer little, if anything, of interest or
use about ﬁrms at either end. A Gaussian study of Ma &
Pa stores works but obscures microniches and offers lit-
tle of value to Wal-Mart. And ﬁnally, any study close
to the average or median (or elsewhere) ignores scalable
dynamics.
What are the implications?
1. When extreme events occur they also alter the
value of the mean—pulling it toward the tail where
the extreme event occurred. Hence Pareto means are
unstable.
2. Compared to “normal” variance, Paretian variance
is potentially inﬁnite. From Ma & Pa stores to Wal-Mart,
proﬁts, assets, and indebtedness range from thousands
to billions of dollars. Proﬁts and assets go from zero or
worse to billions of dollars—crossing about 11 magni-
tudes. Mode, median, and mean are not the same. The
larger the extremes, the less frequent or predictable they
are. But when they happen, they increase the variance—
perhaps more obviously in things like earthquakes and
species abundance but also apparent in ﬁrms, merger and
acquisition (M&A) activities, and bankruptcies.
3. Furthermore, because the variance is poten-
tially inﬁnite, the conﬁdence intervals are considerably
widened, making ﬁndings less apt to be signiﬁcant. The
CLT is meaningless.
Millions of businesses are single-proprietor or Ma &
Pa stores with incomes in the thousands of dollars and
possibly negative wealth. At the other extreme we see a
few giant ﬁrms having hundreds of thousands of employ-
ees, billions of dollars in annual income, and assets
of hundreds of billions—proﬁts and assets can range
across 11 magnitudes. For much organizational thinking,
research, and practical applications, neither the distri-
butions of the variables nor theorizing about the causal
dynamics ﬁts within the Gaussian assumption set. A dif-
ferent approach is needed, based on scalability.
Suppose we study 4,000 people in 500 small stores
in small towns. Their owners’ smartness; creativity; and
knowledge of technology, markets, and customers, as
well as good or bad attitudes, skills, behavior, network-
ing, and so on, affect the other store owners and a couple
hundred regular customers. This is not a bad sample,
but if we improve it, both sample and error disturbances
will become distributed more perfectly “normal.” If we
move the same study to 500 rural outlets of Wal-Mart
we should end up with the same high quality “normal”
distribution and error term disturbances. So far, so good.
But Wal-Mart is huge, having giant stores, many hier-
archical levels, vast proﬁts and assets, and global reach.
So, we expand the sample to 1,000 worldwide. But now
instead of two people at one level in each small store
and 200 small-town customers to deal with, we have
employees, acting at multiple levels in medium to giant
stores, who have to deal with many more increasingly
diverse customers, subordinates and superiors, local zon-
ing issues, M&A issues, and so on. They make deci-
sions ranging from local customer concerns to mid-
management store policies affecting millions of dollars
in proﬁts to top-management policies and M&A activ-
ities with billions of dollars at stake. No doubt, some
aspects of human behavior in the N =1,000 remains
normally distributed. But as we include workers at each
higher level of the hierarchy, things change. As we
add levels, the dollar value of good and bad decisions
increases: Some effects increase exponentially; some
multiplicatively, and some may show interactivity and
positive-feedback effects. Some of these skew distribu-
tions may combine to further assure Pareto-distribution
effects.
What about timing? In small stores, decisions are
pretty much the same from one year to the next. But at
higher levels of Wal-Mart there are “routine” years at all
levels and then some years where signiﬁcant M&A, sup-
plier realignment, or other decisions are made. We could
sample across 5, even 10, years and miss the extreme
outlier decisions such as buying the UK store chain that
appears to be a mistake. If we study Wal-Mart people
at the store-ﬂoor level, in one year, N = 1000 will be
normally distributed. If we study people at all levels
across ﬁve years we might see a shift from normal to
rank/frequency Pareto. But we may miss key extreme
outliers; Wal-Mart doesn’t make the really big decisions
on a regular basis. To the extent our study includes
people in larger and larger within-Wal-Mart networks
and supply chain networks, involves multiple levels, and
covers more years, all of the research issues embedded
in rank/frequency research become more likely. It all
depends on how much scalability is involved.
The Error Term
As noted above, once we plot Pareto distributed x and y
on log scales, our expectation is a straight line. In empir-
ical research, Greene (2002, pp. 7–8) observes that the
clarity of a predicted relationship is clouded by the nor-
mal distribution of error disturbances—mostly, but not
always, due to measurement error. These effects may
be due to unknown or uncontrolled variables, measure-
ment error, or both. How does this bear on Pareto based
research?
Two points follow from the foregoing analysis. First,
it is clear that in a Pareto rank/frequency world both the
predictor function and error term are inﬂuenced by out-
liers that are fundamentally important to the validity of
the analysis, as opposed to what are typically viewed as
“throwaway” outliers in Gaussian statistics. In the lat-
ter, collecting a large sample almost inevitably means
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that the presumed validity of the analysis is improved—
because the outliers have less effect, with statistical
signiﬁcance more easily obtained because of the nar-
rower conﬁdence intervals. In a Pareto world this is not
true:
1. The analysis is faulty, if not totally meaningless, if
the sampling of outliers is insufﬁcient. In a Pareto world,
building up the sample size while ignoring the outliers
actually reduces the validity of the statistical analysis—
it’s like designing buildings based on average quakes
while ignoring big ones.
2. Even though conﬁdence intervals are widened, the
power of the variance is in the long tails—meaning that
if the outliers are properly sampled, the impact of the
increased variance stemming from the tails more than
compensates for the widening of the conﬁdence inter-
vals. For example, a Pareto distributed independent vari-
able may be a strong predictor of a Pareto distributed
dependent variable while leaving the error term iid
(independent, identically distributed, as statisticians pre-
fer); statistical signiﬁcance is still relevant.
3. Correlations between Pareto and “normally” dis-
tributed phenomena are problematic; this needs further
study.
Second, the concept of error rests on the “signal plus
noise” paradigm introduced by Wiener (1949) as part
of cybernetics. This long-standing paradigm is based on
the assumptions that (1) a true measure of the signal
exists as a deterministic function, (2) noise is random
and its emergence is due to the system-environment cou-
pling (and also because of measuring errors), and (3) the
relationship between noise and signal is usually additive
(Kennedy 2003, p. 8). Because noise is assumed to con-
tain no relevant information about the system, ﬁltering
signal from noise is necessary to reconstruct the system’s
dynamical response.
In complex systems we have to rethink the signal-
noise paradigm. The response of a complex system
is a mix of order and disorder, represented in math-
ematical terms by deterministic and chaotic functions.
Schroeder (1991) separates nonlinear “noise” into four
colors, white (random), pink (deterministic chaotic),
brown, and black (Paretian extremes).13 In a com-
plex system, chaotic ﬂuctuations may reﬂect the frac-
tal dimension of a system and its scaling properties.
Consequently, “chaos” can be a fundamental part of the
signal and may convey relevant information about its
dynamics.14 If this is true, then the basis for the dis-
tinction between signal (independent variables that are
usually assumed deterministic and predictable) and noise
(chaotic) becomes blurred (West 2006); consequently,
the separability between signal and error term is called
into question. In other words, if the signal is character-
ized by chaotic ﬂuctuations that exhibit long-term cor-
relations (as is usually the case for Paretian functions),
and the separability between signal and noise cannot
be based on the presence or absence of noise, then it
is to be expected that the error term shows long-term
correlations and “   long-term memory that ties events
together” (West 2006, p. 271)—and it, therefore, is not
Gaussian. This implies that statistical methods based on
ﬁnite variance (i.e., classical regression models) may not
be applicable when dealing with Paretian functions.
Some Methodological Implications
An SF theory approach in research starts from non-
prejudicial views of the environment. Most conventional
research depends on analytical functions and usually
assumes linearity. Additional assumptions, again often
implicit, concern evolutionary gradualism and equilib-
rium, with motion toward equilibrium considered adap-
tive in stable niches. Alternatively, research should
start with a discussion about whether the phenomena
under consideration show weak or strong interdepen-
dence among data points. If the former, then assume
independence and the validity of calculus-based analyt-
ical functions. If the latter, then it is more likely the
world is Paretian. Because fractals are continuous but
inﬁnitely irregular and therefore not amenable to differ-
ential calculus, the use of analytical functions becomes
problematic (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004). The little
known mathematical ﬁelds of fractional calculus and
Lévy-based statistics are more useful (West 2006). Thus
new measures are needed. We focus on these next.
Develop Appropriate Measures of the Variables
Relevant to SF Theories; Test for SF Dynamics:
(1) Start with our new null hypothesis. Determine
whether a distribution is likely to be subjected to mul-
tiple dynamics, some of which may be Paretian, others
Gaussian.15 Two main questions here:
(a) Are the data points independent or interdepen-
dent? and
(b) Are the data points additive or multiplicative or
interactive and scalable?
(2) If the answer is interdependent-multiplicative-
interactive, then test whether interdependence increases
going from small to large events. If yes, lognormal dis-
tributions likely could show Paretian tails. Then
(a) Don’t exclude outliers. Even Pareto distribu-
tions may have inconsistent outliers (due to idiosyncratic
causes); Sornette (2003) calls these “kings” or “black
swans.”
(b) Look for power-law signatures and identify the
relevant parameters of the distributions.
(c) Is it a rank/frequency Pareto distribution?
(3) See if fractal structures exist:
(a) Study nestedness and self-similarity so as to
establish fractal dimension(s);
(b) When looking at spatial, time independent phe-
nomena (or time-dependent phenomena generated by
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distributed structures), look at the underlying generating
network(s). Identify nodes and links and analyze the dis-
tribution of links to nodes. Calculate power-law slopes.
(c) Is the rank/frequency Pareto distribution well-
formed, as indicated by a power-law distribution? It may
signal emergence or not.
(d) For time series, determine fractal dimensions
D: D = 2 − , where  is the scaling index of time
series and  indicates the mix of ordered and random
dynamics in the series (see Figure 2). = 0.5 indicates
a completely random time series—there are no underly-
ing patterns of order; it is purely random walk.  = 0
or  = 1 indicate a completely ordered phenomenon—
no randomness anywhere. The interesting case occurs
when  	= 0 or  	= 1; here the data show a mix of
ordered and random dynamics that builds from previous
ﬂuctuations; the closer the value is to either end or to
the middle, the more dominant the relevant dynamic is:
order or randomness.16 Emergence is most apt to occur
as  goes below 0.25 or above 0.75. In Stanley et al.
(1996) it is =∼0.16.
(e) For instance, Stanley et al. (1996) give an exam-
ple of a hierarchical “Fordist” type organization where
the CEO can order an increase in production, causing a
Markov chain along the hierarchical levels—each subse-
quent action-step at time t is a replica of action at time
t − 1. If it is carried out exactly from top to bottom of
the ﬁrm, then the organization is strongly interdependent
(= 0 for total top-down control, where  is the expo-
nent of the power law describing growth variance), which
means that the variance in growth rate is directly propor-
tional to size. But lower-level managers and employees
rarely follow orders exactly. If all ignore CEO orders,
i.e., all act independently, then = 1/2. Usually employ-
ees follow orders with some probability and stickiness.
Thus for a 0 <  < 1/2 or so (based on Stanley et al.
1996), we expect a power-law effect to obtain. Note that
0<< 1/2 could be due to a CEO’s order implemented
with some probability or it could be due to an emergent
self-organizing process by employees.
Given Measures, then Consider the Following:
1. Develop theories and hypotheses based on SF the-
ory that are aimed at causes or consequences of extreme
events. The tools and measures mentioned above help
identify the nature of the phenomenon and the appropri-
ate SF theory (or mix of). See Table 2 for a list of SF
theories.
2. Carry out empirical studies using data at frequently
occurring scales—i.e., the hundreds or thousands of
smaller events at lower-level scales comparable to the
thousands of smaller quakes. Test whether these kinds
of studies identify causes and consequences of larger
extremes at, say, the next higher scale(s). That is, can
we predict emerging fractal structures one level up in
scale?
3. Because “extreme” extremes are rare in the real
world, take a lesson from the econophysicists and use
computational models to simulate known empirical ﬁnd-
ings and then test whether they stretch toward the more
infrequent “extreme” extremes in the artiﬁcial computa-
tional world.
4. Work backwards from existing extreme events
described in the organizational or managerial literature.
We have already seen these sorts of studies carried out
by ofﬁcial investigations of what led up to the Chal-
lenger and Pioneer disasters, the Bay of Pigs confronta-
tion, Enron, 9/11, and so on. These ﬁndings then can
be “reversed” and further tested by tracing backwards
from extreme to smaller-scale employee networks and
behaviors via computational modeling.
5. Use extreme-event statistics (Baum and McKelvey
2006) to calculate how extreme a future event might be.
If a power-law tail is evident, one can do this simply by
looking down the sloping line.
Conclusion
We suggest that fractals, rank/frequency Pareto distri-
butions, power laws, and underlying scale-free theories
will help organization scientists deal with Gell-Mann’s
“deep simplicity” (1988), scalability explanations of liv-
ing systems in general (2002), and organizational com-
plexity more speciﬁcally. We demonstrate that power
laws are an inextricable aspect of how individuals, orga-
nizations, economies, and societies work. To answer
the call for causal explanations relevant to organiza-
tions, we assemble a list of 15 scale-free theories and
detail how several apply to organizations and manage-
ment. These theories correct two key shortcomings of
Gaussian research. First, they signify Pareto distributions
and extreme events as elements of the managerial world
that need to be accounted to by quantitative researchers;
second, they put positive-feedback and other scale-free
dynamics at the center of analysis.
Abbott’s claim that the General Linear Model “sub-
tly shaped sociologists”’ thinking (2001, p. 7) (and the
thinking of other disciplines such as economics, manage-
ment theory, OB, etc.) may be at the base of the grow-
ing ineffectiveness between theory and practice. The gap
between multiparadigmatic “science” appearing in jour-
nals and practitioner needs (Ghoshal 2005, Van de Ven
and Johnson 2006) signiﬁes the fact that the proliferation
of academic disciplines has not produced research useful
to practitioners (McKelvey 2006, McKelvey and Benbya
2007). Several environmental reasons may lie behind
this reality: the ICT revolution, globalization, and radical
transformations in Asia, for example, have contributed to
the dazzling acceleration of change. These changes have
increased global and local network connectivity making
actors, from individuals to nation states, more interde-
pendent and therefore more exposed to positive-feedback
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Figure 2 Persistence and Anti-Persistence Behavior in Time Series
Order Randomness Order
0 10.5
Anti-persistence region
(like followed with increasing
probability by unlike)
0 = oscillatory pattern
Persistence region
(like followed with increasing
probability by like)
1 = ballistic trajectory)
dynamics and consequent rank/frequency distributions
(Andriani and McKelvey 2007a).
Unfortunately, theories and methodological tools have
not evolved at the same rate and are mostly still rooted
in the time-honored concepts of equilibrium and lin-
earity. In reality, organizational researchers study an
interconnected world—full of rank/frequency disconti-
nuities, chaotic dynamics, fractals, Pareto extremes, and
power laws—with inappropriate research tools. The con-
sequence is the gap between theory and practice that
some theorists and many practitioners lament. In partic-
ular, theories and tools relying on “averages” and limited
variance pledge allegiance to the altar of tradition—they
force researchers to assume homogeneity instead of
heterogeneity and averages instead of rank/frequency
extremes.
The impact on use of statistics is signiﬁcant.
Researchers should start from the assumption that phe-
nomena are rooted in interdependent dynamics and that
long tails are the effect of scalable causal dynamics.
Means and variance are unstable and cannot be used
to represent the phenomenon, unless independence is
demonstrated. We show that predictor and error terms
acquire new meaning. We also show that complexity
offers researchers some tools to characterize the mix of
order and randomness in the systems, and we give exam-
ples about how research could be done in a Paretian
world. More speciﬁcally,
1. Data about the trillions of mosquitoes or millions
of Ma & Pa stores in one tail don’t offer much use-
ful information about the elephants or Wal-Mart in the
opposite tail;
2. Methods that work on the large numbers in
the Ma & Pa tail don’t apply to studying extremes
like Wal-Mart, Microsoft, Enron, or the organizational
response behaviors to disasters like Katrina, Pioneer, and
Challenger;
3. Which is to say, large samples at the mode don’t
speak to any other part of the distribution;
4. Studies of normal distributions at the median or
mean don’t speak to either tail;
5. Distributions of, and in, ﬁrms may not become
“normal” just by increasing sample size;
6. Data collection working hard to include all Paretian
outliers needs to replace approaches that delete outliers
on the assumption that they are all errors and anomalies;
7. Scalable causes, dynamics, and theories become
more important; they are absent from standard econo-
metrics textbooks and current statistical practices in
general;
8. Scalability-relevant methods simply don’t exist
in existing research approaches or in management
theorizing.
The ﬁeld of power-law science, extreme event the-
ory, and complexity is relatively young. From the ﬁrst
Pareto distribution in Pareto’s (1897) publication, Pareto
rank/frequency and then power laws and scale-free the-
ories have appeared in many instances. However, in
comparison with the three centuries of development of
the Newtonian/Gaussian world, power-law science is
far from paradigmatic. There is no accepted standard
for high quality research; limits of predictability are
unknown; tools, frameworks, and methods are scarcely
developed; the “line in the sand” that deﬁnes the spheres
of inﬂuence of Gaussian and Paretian approaches needs
clearer demarcation and new epistemological rules of
justiﬁcation logic.
Scale-free theories offer the promise of explaining
extreme events and reducing the fragmenting effect of
social science disciplines on organizational research.
Discipline-centric researchers may dislike this conse-
quence; discipline-neutral researchers will see research
advantages and practitioner relevance. But remember:
The average of the rank/frequencies from mosquitoes to
elephants, from Ma & Pa to Wal-Mart retail ﬁrms, of
from small aerospace-oriented foundries to Boeing and
Airbus, or small computer repair stores to Microsoft,
offers little useful information to any other part of a
Pareto distribution. As Brunk says (2002, p. 36):
Instead of the bulk of the data being produced by one
process and the “outliers” by another, all events—both
minuscule and the historically monumental—are pro-
duced by the same process in a SOC environment.
Whereas normal distributions call for more stan-
dardized management, the long unique tails of
rank/frequency Pareto distributions call for more unique
managerial responses. We argue that managers live in
a world of mostly Paretian organizational and eco-
nomic rank/frequency phenomena and that the fat/long
tail and chaotic properties of Pareto distributions have
to become more evident in empirical organizational
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research. For some portion of organizational research,
the use of the so-called “robustness” enhancement tech-
niques described in standard econometric textbooks is
dysfunctional. Instead of being deleted, extreme events
have to be properly sampled and analyzed. Given current
quantitative practices, this is, indeed, a call for signiﬁ-
cant change. It is time to change.
Endnotes
1The so-called butterﬂy effect stems from Lorenz’s (1972)
paper: “Does the ﬂap of a butterﬂy’s wings in Brazil set off a
tornado in Texas?” These are Holland’s (2002) “tiny initiating
events” that scale up to extreme outcomes.
2Though a power-law exponent is constant in a particular func-
tion, its exponent may change for different settings, industries,
times, etc. Stanley et al. (1996) ﬁnd slightly different scaling
coefﬁcients across a large sample of ﬁrms for sales, assets,
number of employees, etc. Newman (2005) also shows differ-
ent scaling coefﬁcients.
3In general the exponent b is a multiple of ±1/4.
4“Besides ensuring that Citigroup has a proper handle on
risk, Pandit’s other challenge will be to streamline opera-
tions. Over the years, Citigroup has strapped together a vast
array of businesses across its ﬁve business segments. The bank
is now looking to improve efﬁciency and reduce overlap”
(quoted from the Morningstar stock analyst report on Citi-
group: http://news.morningstar.com/). In New York, for exam-
ple, all the acquired businesses remained in their original,
separate buildings—there was acquisition without integration,
i.e., M&A without the “M.”
5JSIC is the Japanese counterpart to the SIC code in the
United States. Ishikawa (2006) studies all 14 Japanese two-
digit industry classiﬁcations, which in the paper he refers to
as “job categories.”
6Just take a look at the market volatility chart in Ghysels et al.
(2005) and count the number of times the red line (volatili-
ties) goes above the black line, which represents the moving
average (GARCH) line.
7Quoted in West and Deering (1995, p. 83).
8Other robustness techniques (not based on least square esti-
mation) to deal with data sets that deviate from idealized
assumptions can be found in Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987).
In general, these techniques are not based on normal distribu-
tion and CLT but instead use the t-distribution. They assume
ﬁnite variance, and like other robustness techniques, they have
developed highly sophisticated tools (trimming, “winsorizing”
to deal with outliers, skewness and long-tailed distributions
tend to cut the tails start from trimming, winsorizing, etc.).
9From Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robust_Statistics
accessed September 23, 2009).
10Wal-Mart is now the largest company in the world, has rev-
enue more than $280 billion, and serves 138 million shoppers
per year in approximately 5,300 stores (Bianco 2007).
11“Wal-Mart wields its power for just one purpose: to bring the
lowest possible prices to its customers. At Wal-Mart, that goal
is never reached. The retailer has a clear policy for suppliers:
On basic products that don’t change, the price Wal-Mart will
pay, and will charge shoppers, must drop year after year. But
what almost no one outside the world of Wal-Mart and its
21,000 suppliers knows is the high cost of those low prices.
Wal-Mart has the power to squeeze proﬁt-killing concessions
from vendors. To survive in the face of its pricing demands,
makers of everything from bras to bicycles to blue jeans have
had to lay off employees and close U.S. plants in favor of
outsourcing products from overseas” (Fishman 2003).
12Wal-Mart’s lobbying expenses increased by 60% in 2007
(see Sarkar 2008).
13Following West (2006, p. 79) we deﬁne chaos as the “kind
of randomness   which is generated by the nonlinear dynam-
ical property of a system.” Chaos can be divided into deter-
ministic chaos, colored and white noise, deﬁned as follows:
white, truly random, is characterized by a power spectrum
whose exponent 
 = 0 (or frequency independent). Colored
noise is divided into anti-persistent or mean-reverting [pink;
deterministic chaos-based, anti-persistent; known as 1/f or
power spectra with exponent ∼f −1 and persistent (brown
f −2 and black (persistent reoccurrence of extreme events;
f −
 with 
> 2)] (Schroeder 1991). Colored noise and deter-
ministic chaos can also be characterized by their dimension-
ality and pattern/path predictability (Dooley and Van de Ven
1999).
14The origin of chaos in complex systems’ behavior is not
always due to the system-environment coupling—although
environmental interactions may contribute to it (Haken
1983)—but is often endogenous. Two consequences follow:
First, chaos characterizes consistent dynamics of the system
and therefore cannot be discarded as noise. Second, because
chaos and noise are both nonlinear, separating them is prob-
lematic, though Dooley and Van de Ven (1999) and Baum and
Silverman (2001) start down this path empirically. In Paretian
systems a new type of mathematics and statistics is needed
(West and Deering 1995, West 2006).
15Note that the Gaussian distribution belongs to a broader class
of heavy-tailed distributions, the so-called Lévy stable distri-
butions (West and Deering 1995). Lévy distributions need not
be symmetric; they follow a generalized form of the law of
large numbers. Lévy distributions are characterized by four
parameters , 
, , c, where  (0–2) is the exponent, 
 rep-
resents the skewness,  a scaling factor, and c a shift factor.
For 0 <  < 2, we get the family of heavy-tailed distribu-
tions, which includes the Cauchy, Pareto, etc., most of which
show no ﬁnite means and variance.  = 2 yields the Gaus-
sian distribution, which is a particular case of a much larger
statistical distribution family. One referee of this paper notes
that because the Gaussian distribution corresponds to a narrow
region of the general class, decisions presuming the generality
of Gaussian distributions risk being “brittle.”
16More speciﬁcally: 0<< 05 indicates anti-persistence (see
Figure 2). The system “remembers” a ﬂuctuation and reacts
with the opposite. Head is more likely to be followed by tail,
a long stride by a shorter one, exploration by exploitation, or
centralization by decentralization, etc.; 05 <  < 1 indicates
persistence. In ﬁnance draw-downs and draw-ups (Sornette
2003) are repeated, i.e., sudden changes of stock market values
that follow each other. For instance, the 1987 crash was really
three ﬁnancial crashes repeating (30.7% cumulative loss) in a
short time period.
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